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NOTES AND COMMENT
DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS-THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEIR ACTs IN
OUR COURTS.
Of the many juridical problems which followed in the wake of
the World War, not the least important were the questions involv-
ing the new Soviet regime and the effect of the many Soviet decrees
regarding the ownership of property. So closely are the economic
and financial lives of the nations of the world bound up with one
another that the chaos and confusion caused by the Soviet declara-
tions have penetrated into the judicial systems of every major coun-
try of the universe. There are cases reported in England, -France,
Germany, Switzerland, the United States, and many other jurisdic-
tions-all dealing with these very problems. In our own state, we
find the Court of Appeals confronted with case after case in a
steady stream of litigation, the magnitude of which may be attri-
buted to the refusal of the executive department to recognize the
Soviet government.'
Inasmuch as the legal importance of the principles of recogni-
tion and non-recognition of national governments has thus been
brought to the fore, it is of vital interest to review the decisions of
American courts which have dealt with similar perplexities. Not
very much has been written upon the subject in the past, and this
sudden influx of "Russian" cases has been too recent to have given
rise to much discussion in textbooks. However, there are several
excellent and interesting articles in the law reviews of the country.
2
The basic difference between a full-fledged de jure government
and one that is de facto is the element of recognition. A recognized
state is merely a de facto state to which some nation has accorded
the essentials of international acknowledgment and such a state is
de jure as to the recognizing government. 3 A non-recognized power
is either a de facto government or no government at all, depending
upon principles to be discussed subsequently. And so it is quite
evident and true that states do exist regardless of and apart from
recognition,4 though all desire it for the rights and privileges it
confers upon them. Recognition has been defined as "the assurance
given to a new state that it will be permitted to hold its place and
rank, in the capacity of an independent political organism, among
the associated nations." 5 It may be implied from the acts and state-
1 Cardozo, J., in Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E.
917 (1924).
2Fraenkel, The Juristic Status of Foreign States (1925) 25 COL. L. Rzv.
544; Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts (1932) 26
Am. J. INT. LAW 261; Dickenson, Unrecognized Governments (1923) 22 MIcH.
L. REv. 29, 118; Connick, Effects of Soviet Decrees in American Courts (1924)
34 YALE L. J. 499.
'I MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119.
'Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N. Y. 372,
138 N. E. 24 (1923).
1 RivIER, PRINCIPES Du DROIT DES GENS (1896) 57.
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ments of the executive department of a country, 6 and when effected
by the proper political department, it will be conclusive upon the
courts 7 and subject to judicial notice.8  Furthermore, the courts
will seek information regarding recognition from the State Depart-
ment,9 inasmuch as it is a matter entirely within the control of the
executive and legislative branches of the government. 10
One might ask what are the privileges endowed upon a recog-
nized state. Such a state has the right to sue in the courts of the
recognizing state," and is itself immune from suit in those courts.1 2
This immunity follows naturally from the status of sovereignty.
Any other rule would "vex the peace of nations." 13 Nor will the
acts of the recognized nation affecting internal problems be ques-
tioned in our courts.14 What is more, recognition is retroactive and
validates all the acts done by the government from the date of its
creation. 1
The law concerning non-recognized de facto governments is
not so well settled, nor can we do more than describe what condi-
tions are necessary for the establishment of a de facto status. To
use the words of Andrews, J., a de facto state is one which, though
not recognized is "clothed with the power to enforce this author-
ity within its own territory, obeyed by the people over whom it
rules, capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obliga-
tions of an independent power, able to enforce its claims by mili-
tary force, * * . , 16 Clear as this description appears, the
courts have nevertheless experienced some difficulty, in the past cen-
tury, in the determination of specific cases. What the outcome of
'Supra note 3, at 73.
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309 (1918);
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Lt'd, 246 U. S. 304, 38 Sup. Ct. 312 (1918);
Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213, 2 Eng. Ch. 214.
8 Ibid.
'Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct. 80 (1890) ; The Rogdai,
278 Fed. 294 (N. D. Cal. 1920); Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, 1 Q. B. 149
(1894).
' Jones v. United States, supra note 9.
U Republic of Honduras v. Soto, 112 N. Y. 310, 19 N. E. 845 (1889);
United States of America v. Wagner, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 582.
' The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116 (U. S. 1812); Wulfsohn v. Russ. Soc. Fed.
Sov. Rep., supra note 4.
" Wulfsohn v. Russ. Soc. Fed. Soy. Rep., supra note 4.
" Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679(1933); cf. Russian State v. Compagnie Ropit, 53 Journal de Droit Interna-
tional 667 (1925), which says, " * * * while the recognition [de jure] does not
permit a French judge to ignore the Soviet law and to reject it systematically,
en bloc, it does not forbid him to examine in each case the text and the spirit
of such law and to deny to it juridical effect if he thinks that it is contrary to
the essential principles of the political and social organization of France."
"Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct. 83 (1897) ; Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co., supra note 7; Republic of China v. Merchant's Fire
Assur. Corp. of N. Y., 30 F. (2d) 278 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
" Wulfsohn v. Russ. Soc. Fed. Soy. Rep., supra note 4, at 375, 138 N. E.
at 25 (1923).
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these decisions has been, we shall see as we trace the development
of the matter in our courts. One thing, however, has always been
conceded, namely, that whether a stipulated and alleged government
is or is not de facto is a question of fact for the courts to determine. 17
Some of the earliest cases upon the subject arose out of the
British-American conflict of 1812. Probably the most noted of these
was the case of United States v. Rice.'8 In September, 1814, the
British captured Castine, Maine, and established custom-house regu-
lations. The defendant's goods entered the port subject to these
rules and he paid the duties thereon. After evacuation, the Ameri-
can collector of customs sought to levy the duties of our revenue
laws upon the same goods. The Court, holding the attempted im-
position of duties invalid, said, "By the conquest and military occu-
pation of Castine, the enemy acquired that firm possession which
enabled him to exercise the fullest right of sovereignty over that
place * * *." And then, "From the nature of the case, no other
laws could be obligatory upon them (the inhabitants); for where
there is no protection or allegiance, or sovereignty, there can be no
claim to obedience." '9 And so, while the British occupied the port
and were in full control, their government was the only govern-
ment and its regulations were the valid enactments of a de facto
body. Quite recently, in a case even more in point, the doctrine of
the Rice case was cited with approval.20
The Civil War next created a series of problems which gave
rise to further litigation on this point. The question was usually
whether acts done in conformity with the laws laid down by the
Confederacy and the individual seceded states were valid and en-
forceable. In Williams v. Bruffy,21 a leading case, a citizen of a
Confederate state paid to the Confederacy a debt he owed to a
Northerner, under a confiscatory decree of the Confederacy. The
Court held such a payment to be impotent to wipe out the debt
owed, and declared the Confederate decree invalid. The decision
of Justice Field distinguished between actual de facto governments
and the Confederacy, which was merely a large military force at-
tempting to establish an actual de facto government in vain. The
United States never agreed to such action, nor was the Confederacy
ever in undisputed control over the territory it sought to organize.
Justice Field said, "The validity of its acts, both against the parent
state and its citizens or subjects, depends entirely upon its ultimate
success. If it fail to establish itself permanently, all such acts perish
Wulfsohn case, stpra note 4.
214 Wheat. 246 (U. S. 1819).
"Ibid. at 254.
"MacLeod v. United States, 229 U. S. 416, 33 Sup. Ct. 955 (1913). Here,
the collection of duties by a group of insurgents in full control of the port of
Cebu, Philippine Islands, was held to be the valid act of a de facto government,
and an executive order by the President, prescribing for the payment of import
duties in the Philippines was declared non-applicable.
296 U. S. 176 (1877).
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with it. If it succeed, and become recognized, its acts from the
commencement of its existence are upheld as those of an indepen-
dent nation." 22 However, acts of the individual states which were
not contrary to the Constitution, nor inconsistent with public policy,
were upheld by the Supreme Court.2 3 These were the usual ad-
ministrative functions of states, and, inasmuch as these state gov-
ernments were in possession of the "seats of power" undisputedly,
their deeds were valid except as they might result in giving aid to
the Confederacy.2 4
And now we come to a consideration of the modern trend of
our courts on the question. As was stated at the inception of this
article, the Russian revolution and the consequent establishment of
the Soviet regime have created a series of problems for our courts.
These have resolved themselves into two major divisions. One
group contains the cases where the Russian government has been a
party to the action; the other, where the action is between two
parties whose relations have been affected by the Soviet decrees.
The former is pretty well settled in New York; the latter, not so,
due, of course, to the magnitude and breadth of the field.
For all purposes, however, it is now conclusive with us that
the Soviet government is the ruling de facto authority in Russia.
"To refuse to recognize that Soviet Russia is a government regu-
lating the internal affairs of the country is to give to fictions an air
of reality which they do not deserve." 25
The leading case on the subject of Soviet Russia as a defendant
is Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.26 The
plaintiff owned furs which were stored in Russia. The Soviet gov-
ernment passed an act confiscating private property, and, under this
decree, seized the furs in question. The plaintiff brought suit against
the Russian regime for conversion, claiming that, since it was not
recognized by the United States, it ought not be immune from suit
in our courts. The Court, in holding for the defendant, said that
it was not within its power to sit in judgment upon the acts of a
concededly existing sovereign, affecting property situated within its
jurisdiction. There would be no doubt about this decision if de-
fendant were a recognized nation.27 Certainly the resulting evil
2Ibid. at 186.
' Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (U. S. 1868) ; Sprott v. United States, 20
Wall. 459 (U. S. 1874); United States v. Insurance Companies, 22 Wall. 99
(U. S. 1874).
' S upra note 23. And so also where an executor invested funds of an
estate in Confederate bonds, the investment was invalid, because it was a contri-
bution I the wealth and power of the rebellion; Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall.
570 (U. S. 1873).
Pound, C.J., in Salimoff v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 14, at 227.
Supra note 4.
=The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 7 Cranch 116 (U. S. 1812);
Underhill v. Hernandez, supra note 15; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., supra
note 7.
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would be similar in the instant case. The Court quotes from De
Haber v. Queen of Portugal.238 "To cite a foreign potentate into a
municipal court for any complaint against him in his public capacity
is contrary to the law of nations and an insult which he is entitled
to resent." The reason for the rule is that the foreign government
has not submitted itself to our laws. As the Court said, "Whenever
an act done by a sovereign in his sovereign character is questioned
it becomes a matter of negotiation, or of reprisals or of war." 29
In Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario,3 0 the
Court of Appeals refused to entertain a suit brought in our courts
by the present Russian government. The court differentiated the
Wulfsohn case. There the decision was based upon the de facto
sovereignty of the defendant and the fact that it did not submit it-
self to our laws. However, the permission to sue in our courts is a
privilege granted only to governments recognized by our executive
department. Such a privilege depends wholly on comity.31 "Comity
may be defined as that reciprocal courtesy which one member of the
family of nations owes to the others." 32 And so, where our govern-
ment not only refuses to recognize a foreign regime, but gives ade-
quate reasons for its refusal, the courts have no choice but to refuse
to allow a suit by that government.
Commenting upon this case, Osmond K. Fraenkel holds it an
objectionable decision "upon equitable grounds, as permitting breaches
of trust. In cases such as this, in which no political considerations
of any kind are involved, it could well have been decided that the
right to sue did not depend upon recognition." 33 Professor Bor-
chard, in his learned article,34 also regards this decision as unfor-
tunate. The Court-of Appeals, perhaps foreseeing some criticism of
its decision, justified it on the grounds that "public policy must pre-
vail over comity," that often in the past the relations of the United
States and foreign unrecognized governments were so precariotrs
that to permit them to recover money in our courts would be an
inexpedient contribution to a potential enemy. It is submitted that
this attempted justification has no bearing upon the matter. It could
be used with equivalent force in cases of suits by recognized gov-
ernments, with whom our relations may have become critical. How-
ever, it seems that the decision needs no justification and is amply
supported by established authority.35
17 Q. B. 171.
Supra note 14, at 376.
2235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923).
'The Sapphire, 78 U. S. 164 (1870); Republic of Honduras v. Soto,
supra note 11.
"Salimoff v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 14, at 258.
"The Juristic Status of Foreign States, supra note 2, at 551.
" The Unrecognized Government in American Courts, supra note 2.
'The Penza, 277 Fed. 91 (E. D. N. Y. 1921), in which the plaintiff was
denied the privilege of suit.
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Suits between parties whose rights have been altered by the
decrees of Soviet Russia have not been so easily decided. No doubt,
the most famous foreign case on the effect of the confiscatory acts
of Russia on title to property is Luther v. Sager.36 In the first
appeal the Court held the Soviet decrees invalid to deprive one of
title. When the second appeal was made, the Court took judicial
notice that there had been a de facto recognition of Russia since
the first appeal. Since English courts do not distinguish between
de facto and de jure governments in such cases, it was held that this
subsequent recognition made valid all the prior acts of the govern-
ment. Consequently, a purchaser from the Russian authorities of
property confiscated from the plaintiff had an unimpeachable title
in England.
In America, the matter was very much confused. The Supreme
Court, in The Nueva, Anna & Liebra,37 had decided that the capture
by a Mexican commander did not deprive the owner of the title
to his property, because the United States had recognized neither
the Mexican republic nor the existence of a state of war. Outside
of this very unsatisfactory case, there was, up until this year, no
superior court decision directly on the point.3
8
In Sokoloff v. National City Bank,3 9 the Court decided that
Russian liquidation of all banks and confiscation of all deposits did
not wipe out the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff who had
deposited money with the defendant in New York for an account
in its Russian branch. But Cardozo, J., said, "There is room for
debate whether relief from liability would follow if the acts set up
in its defendant's answer were those of a government de jure." 40
The decrees of Russia could only stop the defendant's business in
Russia. It could not dissolve the defendant corporation, since it
had been incorporated here, nor could it free the defendant from
its just debts. To the same effect was the decision in James & Co.
v. Second Russian Insurance Co.41 Other cases have held that, as
to Russian corporations doing business outside of Russia, the de-
crees had no extraterritorial effect.42 In Sliosberg v. New York Life
Insurance Co.,43 Judge Kellog, confronted with the possibility of the
validating of prior acts by the subsequent recognition of Russia,
"1 K. B. 456 (1921) ; later reversed in 3 K. B. 532 (1921).
' 6 Wheat. 193 (U. S. 1821).
"But see English cases holding seizures by non-recognized governments to
be similar to captures by lawless bodies. Bank v. Comptoir D'Escompte de
Mulhouse, 2 K. B. 630, 638 (1923); Banque Internationale v. Goukassow, 2
K. B. 682 (1923).
"Supra note 1.
4Ibid. at 166.
1239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369 (1925).
'First Russian Insurance Co. v. Beha, 240 N. Y. 601, 148 N. E. 722
(1925) ; Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 170
N. E. 479 (1930).
"244 N. Y. 482, 155 N. E. 749 (1927).
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said, "We do not think that the public weal required that honest
creditors should be made to abide the time when a law, inherently
unjust and confiscatory, enacted by a governmental power, then re-
garded as barbarous, might become an effective weapon of defense,
through the recognition of that power as a worthy member of the
society of civilized nations." This is indeed a vehement, but logical
declaration.
Finally, in July of this year, the Court of Appeals was faced
with the case of Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,44 which, for
the first time, squarely presented to it a conflict of title between an
original owner and a subsequent purchaser of property confiscated
by Russia. The plaintiffs' oil lands were taken by Russia under
its nationalization acts, and oil from these lands were sold to the
defendant. The plaintiffs, Russian nationals, joined in an equitable
action for an accounting, claiming that the seizure by unrecognized
Russia could no more affect the title of the plaintiffs than acts of
bandits.45 The Court held that the test with us was as laid down
in Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard.46 If "within Russia, the
Soviet decrees have actually attained such effect as to alter the rights
and obligations of parties in a manner we may not in justice dis-
regard, * * *," then we shall give effect to those decrees in our
courts. As a recovery here was based on an alleged conversion,
there could be no recovery unless the act done was a wrong at the
place of commission.4 7 But the Soviet regime was obviously the
true, de facto sovereign of Russia and its acts valid by the law of
nations. Hence, the confiscation by the government of the plain-
tiffs' lands and oil deprived the latter of their title to the property,
and they could maintain no action against purchasers of that prop-
erty from the Russian nation. Thus, this case definitely settles the
question in this state, and it is submitted that similar issues will be
similarly decided in other states upon the strength of the logic of
the case.
As this article is being written there is considerable talk of the
possibility that the United States will formally recognize the Russian
Soviet government before the year is out. If that should happen,
all future litigation will be governed by the principles mentioned
above in regard to recognized nations. But, whatever the outcome,
the leading New York decisions discussed herein will remain a guid-
ing light to all controversies which may arise in the future, relative
to de facto governments.
MAX MILSTEIN.
Supra note 14.
'Luther v. Sagor, supra note 36.
" 240 N. Y. 149, 157, 147 N. E. 703 (1925).
"Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp., 245 N. Y. 152, 154, 156 N. E. 647 (1927).
